



Summer Semester 2019

Governance & 'Politik'

(35540/35541 – 3 SWS)

1. Objectives

The main aim of this course is to make students familiar with the existing concepts and conceptions of governance and to enable them to independently apply these concepts and conceptions for the analysis of the polity and politics of (nation) states, bureaucracies, and international organizations. Moreover, the course introduces students to selected core concepts, conceptions, and frameworks in political science.

2. Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this course students should

- be familiar with selected core concepts, conceptions and frameworks in political science,
- be familiar with the existing concepts and conceptions of governance,
- be able to apply the above concepts, conceptions, and frameworks in order to independently analyse the polity and politics of (nation) states, bureaucracies, and international organizations,
- have some basic understanding how collective choice (and game) theory can be utilized in order to analyse governance structures.

3. Pre-requisites

None.

4. Teaching and Learning Strategies

This course is intended to be an interactive lecture and tutorial course formally comprising 11 lectures (90 minutes) and 8 tutorials (60 minutes). At the end of the course an additional 'Question & Answer' session will be offered on

Wednesday 17 July 2019, 13:30-14:00 (Room RW II S 68).

Lecture slides and the tutorials' material will be made available on the e-learning server.

5. Schedule

During the semester the lectures (L) and tutorials (T) will take place as follows:

<i>Lecture/Tutorial</i>	<i>Day</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Room</i>
01 (L)	Tuesday	23 Apr	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
01 (T)	Wednesday	24 Apr	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
02 (L)	Tuesday	07 May	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
02 (T)	Wednesday	08 May	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
03 (L)	Tuesday	14 May	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
03 (T)	Wednesday	15 May	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
04 (L)	Tuesday	21 May	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
04 (T)	Wednesday	22 May	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
05 (L)	Tuesday	28 May	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
05 (T)	Wednesday	29 May	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
06 (L)	Tuesday	04 Jun	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
06 (T)	Wednesday	05 Jun	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
07 (T)	Wednesday	12 Jun	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
07 (L)	Tuesday	18 Jun	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
08 (T)	Wednesday	19 Jun	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
08 (L)	Tuesday	09 Jul	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
09 (L Part 1)	Wednesday	10 Jul	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
10 (L)	Tuesday	16 Jul	16:15 – 17:45	RW II S 40
09 (L Part 2)	Wednesday	17 Jul	11:00 – 12:00	NW II H 20
11 (L)	Wednesday	17 Jul	12:00 – 13:30	RW II S 68

6. Assessment

The course is assessed by a one-hour unseen written examination at the end of the term. In the exam students can achieve a maximum of 100 marks. (If the number of participating students is less than five, an oral examination may replace the written one. Students will be informed about the form of examination as soon as possible.) The date of the examination can be found on <http://www.bwl5.uni-bayreuth.de/de/studiendekan/klausurtermine/>. Students have to register for the examination via CAMPUSonline. Only if students cannot register via CAMPUSonline they can register via e-mail by sending an e-mail to Clara Immler: clara.immler@uni-bayreuth.de. This e-mail must only contain the title of the course, the student's surname, first name, ID number and degree of study as well as a brief indication why registration via e-mail is required. The registration deadline is one week in advance to the date of the examination. Later registrations will not be accepted.

Moreover, students have the opportunity to earn up to 10 bonus marks (which will be added to the marks achieved in the written examination), if they agree to deliver a presentation of about 15 minutes length on a selected topic and to produce a corresponding handout (about 2-3 pages). The available topics will be announced during the first lecture (and will also be available on the e-learning server). Students are expected to submit a draft version of their handout (and presentation if available) two days in advance of their presentation and a final version one week after their presentation. The decision on the allocation of the topics to students will take place during the second lecture.

7. Lecture Programme

Part I: Core Concepts

1. Concepts vs. Conceptions

[7]: 3

2. 'Politik'

[13]: 4-6; [29]: 25-28

3. Institutions and Organizations

[1]: 164, 171, 177 f.; [8]: 7-10; [11]: 22 f.; [14]: 78-81; [16]: 33; [20]: 62; [22]: 5 f.; [31]: 4-7

4. Power, Authority, and Influence

[4]: 11-16; [6]; [10]; [19]: 143-153, [20]: 66; [21]: 485-493; [22]: 518, [23], [27], [41]: xiv-xvii (optional reading), 15-17 (optional reading), 29-35 (optional reading), [45]: 28

5. Governance

[2]; [3]: 1-15; [8]: 1-15; [9]; [12]; [36] (optional reading); [37]: 53-61 (optional reading); [38] (optional reading); [39]: 5f. (Optional reading); [40]: 1-3 (optional reading); [44]: 60-62 (optional reading), 65-67 (optional reading)

Part II: Conceptions and Frameworks

6. Institutional Rational Choice

[11]: 21-64, [35] (optional reading), [43] (optional reading)

7. Organizational Governance

[3]: 16-36; [21]: 502 f.

8. Governance of States

[5]: 143-149; [24]: 19-23

8.1 Democracy

[7]: 83-98; [24]: 35, 40

8.2 Authoritarian Rule

[5]: 349-411; [7]: 99-117; [24]: 54

8.3 Measures of Democracy and the Authoritarian Rule

[5]: 149-167

9. Governance and Society: Linking State and Society

9.1 Basic Paradigms: Liberal-Pluralism, Marxism-Leninism, and Corporatism

[8]: 22 f.; [15]: 1-26, 152-176, [34]: 359-387 (optional reading)

9.2 Problems with Group Decision-making

[5]: 413-424; [25]: 134-138; [26]: 121-137

9.3 Elections

[5]: 535-602; [7]: 179-201; [24]: 245-254; [42]: 324-337

- 9.4 General Collective Choice Problems
 - [5]: 424-427, 439-447; [25]: 138-147; [30]: 115-173, [32]: 205-231
- 10. Governance and Government
 - 10.1 Constitutions and Law
 - [7]: 247-270; [24]: 71-90
 - 10.2 Multilevel Governance
 - [7]: 271-293; [18]
 - 10.3 Legislatures
 - [7]: 295-317
 - 10.4 The Political Executive
 - [5]: 457-533; [7]: 319-344
 - 10.5 Public Governance
 - [3]: 57-79; [8]: 19-58; [24]: 152-168
- 11. Global Governance (self study)
 - [3]: 80-100; [8]: 59-98; [17]; [28]: 75-93; [33]

Part III: Case Studies

- 12. Electoral Systems and Paradoxes
 - 12.1 The Paradox of Proportional Representation
 - [50]
 - 12.2 Election Inversion under Proportional Representation
 - [53]; [65]
 - 12.3 Electoral Systems Used around the World
 - [73]
 - 12.4 A Welfarist Critique of Social Choice Theory
 - [63]
- 13. Democracy & Populism
 - 13.1 Liberalism vs. Populism: Two Approaches To Democracy
 - [46]: 1-12; [71]: 4-14, 233-252
 - 13.2 An Epistemic Conception of Democracy
 - [52]
 - 13.3 What is Populism
 - [67]: 1-20; [69]: 7-74 (optional reading)
 - 13.4 Populism and Democracy
 - [67]: 79-96; [69]: 7-74 (optional reading)

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- 13.5 Causes and Responses to Populism
[67]: 97-118; [69]: 75-103 (optional reading)
 - 13.6 The Crisis of Liberal Democracy
[66]: 23-132
 - 13.7 Origins of the Crisis of Liberal Democracy
[66]: 133-182
 - 13.8 Remedies Against the Crisis of Liberal Democracy
[66]: 183-266
 - 13.9 The Democratic Fatigue Syndrome: Symptoms and Diagnoses
[70]: 1-57
 - 13.10 Populism and Economics
[59]; [61]; [72]
 - 13.11 Rethinking Populism
[47]
 - 14. Democracy of the Future
 - 14.1 Proposals for a Democracy of the Future
[57]
 - 14.2 Comments on "Proposals for a Democracy of the Future"
[51]; [56]; [62]; [70]: 138-150; [75]; [76]
 - 14.3 Direct Voting and Proxy Voting
[58]; [64]; [74]
 - 14.4 Representative Democracy via Random Selection
[68]
 - 14.5 Liquid Democracy
[54]; [55]
 - 14.6 Google Votes: A Liquid Democracy Experiment
[60]
 - 14.7 Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives
[48]
 - 15. Against Democracy – A Case for Epistocracy
 - 15.1 Ignorant, Irrational, Misinformed Nationalists?
[49]: 1-17, 23-53
 - 15.2 Political Participation Corrupts?
[49]: 54-73
 - 15.3 Empowerment of Whom?
[49]: 74-111

Note: The numbers in brackets refer to numbers of the sources below.

8. Literature

8.1 Core Reading

- [1] Bates, FL and Harvey, CC (1975) *The Structure of Social Systems*, Gardner Press.
- [2] Benz, A and Dose, N (2009) Governance – Modebegriff oder nützliches sozialwissenschaftliches Konzept?, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), *Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*, 2nd edn., VS Verlag: 13-36.
- [3] Bevir, M (2012) *Governance: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press.
- [4] Braham, M (2008) Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis, in: Braham, M and Steffen, F (eds), *Power, Freedom, and Voting*, Springer: 1-21.
- [5] Clark, WR, Golder, M, and Golder SN (2013) *Principles of Comparative Politics*, 2nd edn., Sage.
- [6] Dowding, K (2011) Authority, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 36-39.
- [7] Hague, R and Harrop, M (2010) *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 8th edn., Palgrave Macmillan.
- [8] Kjaer, AM (2004) *Governance*, Polity Press.
- [9] Levi-Faur, D (2012) From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press: 3-18.
- [10] Morriss, P (2011) Ability, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 1 f.
- [11] Ostrom, E (2007) Institutional Rational Choice, in: Sabatier, PA (ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process*, 2nd edn., Westview Press: 21-64.
- [12] Peters, BG (2012) Governance as Political Theory, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press: 19-32.
- [13] Schubert, K and Bandelow, N (2009) *Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0*, 2nd edn., Oldenbourg
- [14] Voigt, S (2009) *Institutionenökonomik*, 2nd edn., UTB.
- [15] Wiarda, HJ (1997) *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism”*, M.E. Sharpe.

8.2 Required Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core reading students should read (selected parts of) the following sources:

- [16] Arrow, KJ (1974) *The Limits of Organization*, Norton.
- [17] Behrens, M (2009) Global Governance, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), *Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*, 2nd edn., VS Verlag: 93-110.
- [18] Benz, A (2009) Multilevel Governance – Governance in Mehrebenensystemen, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), *Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*, 2nd edn., VS Verlag: 111-135.
- [19] Braham, M and Holler, MJ (2005) The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 17: 137-157.
- [20] Brink, R van den and Steffen, F (2008) Positional Power in Hierarchies, in: Braham, M and Steffen, F (eds), *Power, Freedom, and Voting*, Springer: 57-81.
- [21] French, R et al. (2011) *Organizational Behaviour*, 2nd edn., Wiley.
- [22] Martin, J (1998) *Organizational Behaviour*, International Thomson Business Press.
- [23] Morriss, P (2011) Ableness, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 2.
- [24] Newton, K and Deth JW van den (2010) *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press.
- [25] Nurmi, H (1998) *Rational Behaviour and the Design of Institutions*, Edward Elgar.

- [26] Nurmi, H (2006) *Models of Political Economy*, Routledge.
- [27] Pansardi, P (2011) Power To and Power Over, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 521-524.
- [28] Pierre, J and Peters BG (2000) *Governance, Politics and the State*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- [29] Prittwitz, V von (2007) *Vergleichende Politikanalyse*, Lucius & Lucius UTB.
- [30] Riker, WH (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism*, Freeman.
- [31] Senior, B (2002) *Organisational Change*, Prentice Hall.
- [32] Taylor, AD and Pacelli, AM (2008), *Mathematics and Politics*, 2nd ed., Springer.
- [33] Zürn, M (2012) Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press: 730-744.

8.3 Optional Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core and required supplementary reading students might find it helpful and/or informative to read (selective parts of) the following source:

- [34] Gallagher, M et al. (1995) *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, McGraw Hill.
- [35] Imperial, MT (1999) Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, *Environmental Management* 24: 449-465.
- [36] Jordan, A, Wurzel, RK, and Zito, A (2005) The Rise of 'New' Policy Instruments in Comparative Perspective: Has Governance Eclipsed Government?, *Political Studies* 53: 477-496.
- [37] Johnson, P and Gill J (1993) *Management Control and Organizational Behaviour*, Paul Chapman Publishing.
- [38] Kersbergen, K. van and Waarden, F. van (2004) 'Governance' as a Bridge Between Disciplines: Cross-disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy, *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 143-171.
- [39] Kumar, S (2010) *Corporate Governance*, Oxford University Press.
- [40] Lattemann, C (2010) *Corporate Governance im globalisiertem Informationszeitalter*, Oldenbourg.
- [41] Morriss, P (1987/2002) *Power: A Philosophical Analysis*, 2nd edn., Manchester University Press.
- [42] Orvis, S and Drogus, CA (2015), *Introducing Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases in Context*, SAGE / CQ Press.
- [43] Polski, MM and Ostrom, E (1999) An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design, Indiana University, *Mimeo*.
- [44] Tricker, B (2012) *Corporate Governance*, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press.
- [45] Weber, M (1972) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen.

8.4 Case Study Reading

- [46] Achen, CH and Bartels, LM (2016), *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*, Princeton University Press.
- [47] Blühdorn, I and Butzlaff, F (2018) Rethinking Populism: Peak Democracy, Liquid Identity and the Performance of Sovereignty, *European Journal of Social Theory* 22: 191-211
- [48] Blum, C and Zuber, CI (2016) Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives, *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 24: 162-182.
- [49] Brennan, J (2016) *Against Democracy*, Princeton University Press.

- [50] Brockington, D (2004) The Paradox of Proportional Representation: The Effect of Party Systems and Coalitions on Individuals' Electoral Participation, *Political Studies* 52: 469-490
- [51] Brouwer, P and Staal, K (2018), The Democracy of the Future: Do Voters Want It?, *Homo Oeconomicus* 35: 133-141.
- [52] Cohen, J (1986) An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, *Ethics* 97: 26-38.
- [53] Felsenthal, DS and Miller, NR (2015) What to Do about Election Inversions under Proportional Representation?, *Representation* 51: 173-186.
- [54] Ford, B. (2002) Delegative Democracy, *Mimeo* [<http://bford.info/log/22002/0515-DelegativeDecomcracy.pdf>]
- [55] Ford, B. (2014) Delegative Democracy Revisited, *Mimeo* [<http://bford.info/2014/11/16/deleg.html>.]
- [56] Franzoni, LA (2018), The Voter in the House of Mirrors, *Homo Oeconomicus* 35: 117-121.
- [57] Frey, BS (2017) Proposals for a Democracy of the Future, *Homo Oeconomicus* 34: 1-9.
- [58] Green-Armytage, J (2015) Direct Voting and Proxy Voting, *Constitutional Political Economy* 26: 190-220.
- [59] Guriev, S (2018) Economic Drivers of Populism, *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 108: 200-203.
- [60] Hardt, S and Lopes, LCR (2015) Google Votes: A Liquid Democracy Experiment on a Corporate Social Network, *Technical Disclosure Commons* (June 5, 2015) [http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/79].
- [61] Kaltwasser, CR (2018) Studying the (Economic) Consequences of Populism, *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 108: 204-207.
- [62] Köppl-Turyna, M (2018), Some Thoughts on Frey's "Proposal for a Democracy of the Future", *Homo Oeconomicus* 35: 127-131.
- [63] Lethinen, A (2011) A Welfarist Critique of Social Choice Theory, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 23: 359-381.
- [64] Miller, JC (1969), A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process, *Public Choice* 7: 107-113.
- [65] Miller, NR (2014) Election Inversion under Proportional Representation, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 38: 4-25.
- [66] Mounk, Y (2018) *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*, The Belknap Press.
- [67] Mudde, C and Kaltwasser, CR (2017) *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press.
- [68] Mueller, DC, Tollison, RD and Willett, TD (1972) Representative Democracy via Random Selection, *Public Choice* 12: 57-68.
- [69] Müller, W (2016) *What Is Populism?*, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- [70] Reybrouck, D v (2016) *Against Elections - The Case for Democracy*, Bodley Head.
- [71] Riker, WH (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Waveland Press.
- [72] Rodrik, D (2018) Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?, *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 108: 196-199.
- [73] Shahandashti, SF (2016) Electoral Systems Used around the World, *Mimeo*, School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, UK.
- [74] Shubik, M (1970) On Homo Politicus and the Instant Referendum, *Public Choice* 9: 79-84.
- [75] Tridimas, G (2018), On Sortition, *Homo Oeconomicus* 35: 91-100.

[76] Tsebelis, G (2018), How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”, *Homo Oeconomicus* 35: 81-90.

Note: All sources for the course will be made available on the e-learning server.

9. Accreditation

- Economics (MA):
Modulbereich Spezialisierung „Governance“: Governance, Wettbewerb & gesellschaftliche Entwicklung
Modulbereich: Individueller Schwerpunkt
- IWG:
Modulbereich c (Vertiefung): Spezialisierung „Governance & Public Management“
Modulbereich: Individueller Schwerpunkt
- P&E (MA):
Modul Area: Specialization

10. Responsible Student Assistant for the Course

All requests regarding the course should, in the first instance, be addressed to:

- Clara Immler:
E-mail: clara.immler@uni-bayreuth.de

Document last revised: 21 April 2019