



Summer Semester 2021

Governance & 'Politik'

(35540/35541 – 3 SWS)

1. Objectives

The main aim of this course is to make students familiar with the existing concepts and conceptions of governance and to enable them to independently apply these concepts and conceptions for the analysis of the polity and politics of (nation) states, bureaucracies, and international organizations. Moreover, the course introduces students to selected core concepts, conceptions, and frameworks in political science.

2. Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this course students should

- be familiar with selected core concepts, conceptions and frameworks in political science,
- be familiar with the existing concepts and conceptions of governance,
- be able to apply the above concepts, conceptions, and frameworks in order to independently analyse the polity and politics of (nation) states, bureaucracies, and international organizations,
- have some basic understanding how collective choice (and game) theory can be utilized in order to analyse governance structures.

3. Pre-requisites

None.

4. Teaching and Learning Strategies

This course is intended to be an interactive lecture and tutorial course formally comprising 11 lectures (90 minutes) and 9 tutorials (60 minutes). At the end of the course an additional 'Question & Answer' session will be offered on

Wednesday 07 July 2021, 11:30-12:00 (via Zoom).

Lecture slides and the tutorials' material will be made available on the e-learning server.

5. Schedule

During the semester the lectures (L) and tutorials (T) will take place as follows:

<i>Lecture/Tutorial</i>	<i>Day</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Room</i>
01 (L)	Tuesday	13 Apr	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
01 (T)	Wednesday	14 Apr	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
02 (L)	Tuesday	20 Apr	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
02 (T)	Wednesday	21 Apr	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
03 (L)	Tuesday	27 Apr	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
03 (T)	Wednesday	28 Apr	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
04 (L)	Tuesday	04 May	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
04 (T)	Wednesday	05 May	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
05 (L)	Tuesday	11 May	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
05 (T)	Wednesday	12 May	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
06 (L)	Tuesday	18 May	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
06 (T)	Wednesday	19 May	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
07 (T)	Wednesday	26 May	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
07 (L)	Tuesday	01 Jun	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
08 (T)	Wednesday	02 Jun	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
08 (L)	Tuesday	08 Jun	16:00 – 17:00	via Zoom
09 (T)	Wednesday	09 Jun	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
09 (L)	Tuesday	15 Jun	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
10 (L Part 1)	Wednesday	16 Jun	11:00 – 12:00	via Zoom
11 (L)	Tuesday	06 Jul	16:00 – 17:30	via Zoom
10 (L Part 2)	Wednesday	07 Jul	11:00 – 11:30	via Zoom

6. Assessment

The course is assessed by a one-hour unseen written examination at the end of the term. In the exam students can achieve a maximum of 100 marks. (If the number of participating students is less than five, an oral examination may replace the written one. Students will be informed about the form of examination as soon as possible.) The date of the examination can be found on <http://www.bwl5.uni-bayreuth.de/de/studiendekan/klausurtermine/>. Students have to register for the examination via CAMPUSonline. Only if students cannot register via CAMPUSonline they can register via e-mail by sending an e-mail to Johannes Hahn: johannes.hahn@uni-bayreuth.de. This e-mail must only contain the title of the course, the student's surname, first name, ID number and degree of study as well as a brief indication why registration via e-mail is required. The registration deadline is one week in advance to the date of the examination. Later registrations will not be accepted.

Moreover, students have the opportunity to earn up to 10 bonus marks (which will be added to the marks achieved in the written examination), if they agree to deliver a presentation of about 15-20 minutes length on a selected topic and to produce a corresponding handout (about 2-3 pages). The available topics will be announced during the first lecture (and will also be available on the e-learning server). Students are expected to submit a draft version of their handout (and presentation if available) two days in advance of their presentation and a final version one week after their presentation. The decision on the allocation of the topics to students will take place during the second lecture.

7. Lecture Programme

Part I: Core Concepts

1. Concepts vs. Conceptions

[7]: 3

2. 'Politik'

[14]: 4-6; [31]: 25-28

3. Institutions and Organizations

[1]: 164, 171, 177 f.; [9]: 7-10; [12]: 22 f.; [15]: 12-20, 60-62; [17]: 33; [21]: 62; [23]: 5 f.; [33]: 4-7

4. Power, Authority, and Influence

[4]: 11-16; [6]; [11]; [20]: 143-153, [21]: 66; [22]: 316-323; [23]: 518, [24], [29], [43]: xiv-xvii (optional reading), 15-17 (optional reading), 29-35 (optional reading), [47]: 28

5. Governance

[2]; [3]: 1-15; [9]: 1-15; [10]; [13]; [38] (optional reading); [39]: 53-61 (optional reading); [40] (optional reading); [41]: 5f. (Optional reading); [42]: 1-3 (optional reading); [46]: 66-69 (optional reading), 70-73 (optional reading)

Part II: Conceptions and Frameworks

6. Institutional Rational Choice

[12]: 21-64, [37] (optional reading), [45] (optional reading)

7. Organizational Governance

[3]: 16-36; [22]: 382 f.

8. Governance of States

[5]: 89-93, 145-150; [8]: 52-69; [26]: 20-23

8.1 Democracy

[7]: 83-98; [8]: 70-88; [25]: 35; [26]: 42

8.2 Authoritarian Rule

[5]: 353-408; [7]: 99-117; [8]: 89-105; [26]: 59

8.3 Measures of Democracy and the Authoritarian Rule

[5]: 150-173

9. Governance and Society: Linking State and Society

9.1 Basic Paradigms: Liberal-Pluralism, Marxism-Leninism, and Corporatism

[9]: 22 f.; [16]: 1-26, 152-176, [36]: 359-387 (optional reading)

9.2 Problems with Group Decision-making

[5]: 409-420; [27]: 134-138; [28]: 121-137

9.3 Elections

[5]: 521-583; [8]: 252-269; [26]: 248-256; [44]: 324-337

- 9.4 General Collective Choice Problems
 - [5]: 420-422, 434-441; [27]: 138-147; [32]: 115-173, [34]: 205-231
- 10. Governance and Government
 - 10.1 Constitutions and Law
 - [8]: 106-123; [26]: 77-90
 - 10.2 Multilevel Governance
 - [7]: 271-293; [8]: 179-198; [19] (optional reading); [26]: 110-137
 - 10.3 Legislatures
 - [8]: 141-159
 - 10.4 The Political Executive
 - [5]: 453-511; [7]: 319-344; [8]: 124-140
 - 10.5 Public Governance
 - [3]: 57-79; [8]: 160-178; [9]: 19-58; [26]: 155-174
- 11. Global Governance (self study)
 - [3]: 80-100; [9]: 59-98; [18]; [30]: 75-93; [35]

Part III: Case Studies

- 12. Democracy & Populism
 - 12.1 Liberalism vs. Populism: Two Approaches To Democracy
 - [48]: 1-12; [65]: 4-14, 233-252
 - 12.2 What is Populism
 - [62]: 1-20; [63]: 7-74 (optional reading)
 - 12.3 Populism and Democracy
 - [62]: 79-96; [63]: 7-74 (optional reading)
 - 12.4 Causes and Responses to Populism
 - [62]: 97-118; [63]: 75-103 (optional reading)
 - 12.5 The Crisis of Liberal Democracy
 - [61]: 23-132
 - 12.6 Origins of the Crisis of Liberal Democracy
 - [61]: 133-182
 - 12.7 The Democratic Fatigue Syndrome: Symptoms and Diagnoses
 - [65]: 1-57
- 13. Electoral Representation and Electoral Reforms
 - 13.1 The Crisis of (Liberal) Democracy – A Crisis of Electoral Representation?
 - [51]
 - 13.2 The Dual Purpose of Elections & How to Think about Electoral Systems
 - [56]: 1-17

-
- 13.3 Proportional Representation and the Alternative to it & The Dual-Vote Device: The German Federal Electoral System
[56]: 18-35
 - 13.4 Who Will Win? Who ought to Win? & Majority Preferences
[56]: 36-37
 - 13.5 Rival Criteria & Systems Based on Criteria
[56]: 38-88
 - 13.6 Proportional Representation & The Principles of Electoral Reform
[56]: 158-186
 - 14. Examining and Revising the German Federal Electoral System
 - 14.1 Inconsistencies Between Votes and Seats
[49]
 - 14.2 Inconsistencies Between Preferences and Seats
[54]; [58]; [59]
 - 15. Democracy of the Future
 - 15.1 Direct Voting and Proxy Voting
[57]; [61]; [67]
 - 15.2 Representative Democracy via Sortition
[65]: 138-150; [53]
 - 15.3 Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives
[50]
 - 16. Against Democracy – A Case for Epistocracy
 - 16.1 Ignorant, Irrational, Misinformed Nationalists?
[51]: 1-17, 23-53
 - 16.2 Political Participation Corrupts?
[51]: 54-73
 - 16.3 Empowerment of Whom?
[51]: 74-111
 - 17. Non-Democratic Regimes
 - 17.1 Studying Non-Democratic Regimes & The Three Phases of Modernizing the Non-Democratic Rule
[52]: 1-12
 - 17.2 Theoretical Approaches to Non-Democratic Regimes
[52]: 13-40
 - 17.3 Disguised Dictatorship
[52]: 225-254

Note: The numbers in brackets refer to numbers of the sources below.

8. Literature

8.1 Core Reading

- [1] Bates, FL and Harvey, CC (1975) *The Structure of Social Systems*, Gardner Press.
- [2] Benz, A and Dose, N (2009) Governance – Modebegriff oder nützliches sozialwissenschaftliches Konzept?, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), *Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*, 2nd edn., VS Verlag: 13-36.
- [3] Bevir, M (2012) *Governance: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press.
- [4] Braham, M (2008) Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis, in: Braham, M and Steffen, F (eds), *Power, Freedom, and Voting*, Springer: 1-21.
- [5] Clark, WR, Golder, M, and Golder SN (2018) *Principles of Comparative Politics*, 3rd edn., Sage. *)
- [6] Dowding, K (2011) Authority, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 36-39.
- [7] Hague, R and Harrop, M (2010) *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 8th edn., Palgrave Macmillan.
- [8] Hague, R et al. (2019) *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 11th edn., Red Globe Press. *)
- [9] Kjaer, AM (2004) *Governance*, Polity Press.
- [10] Levi-Faur, D (2012) From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press: 3-18.
- [11] Morriss, P (2011) Ability, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 1 f.
- [12] Ostrom, E (2007) Institutional Rational Choice, in: Sabatier, PA (ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process*, 2nd edn., Westview Press: 21-64.
- [13] Peters, BG (2012) Governance as Political Theory, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press: 19-32.
- [14] Schubert, K and Bandelow, N (2009) *Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0*, 2nd edn., Oldenbourg
- [15] Voigt, S (2019) *Institutional Economics*, Cambridge University Press..
- [16] Wiarda, HJ (1997) *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism”*, M.E. Sharpe.

8.2 Required Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core reading students should read (selected parts of) the following sources:

- [17] Arrow, KJ (1974) *The Limits of Organization*, Norton.
- [18] Behrens, M (2009) Global Governance, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), *Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*, 2nd edn., VS Verlag: 93-110.
- [19] Benz, A (2009) Multilevel Governance – Governance in Mehrebenensystemen, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), *Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*, 2nd edn., VS Verlag: 111-135.
- [20] Braham, M and Holler, MJ (2005) The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 17: 137-157.
- [21] Brink, R van den and Steffen, F (2008) Positional Power in Hierarchies, in: Braham, M and Steffen, F (eds), *Power, Freedom, and Voting*, Springer: 57-81.
- [22] French, R et al. (2015) *Organizational Behaviour*, 3rd edn., Wiley. *)
- [23] Martin, J (1998) *Organizational Behaviour*, International Thomson Business Press.
- [24] Morriss, P (2011) Ableness, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 2.

- [25] Newton, K and Deth JW van den (2010) *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press.
- [26] Newton, K and Deth JW van den (2021) *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, 4th edn. Cambridge University Press. *)
- [27] Nurmi, H (1998) *Rational Behaviour and the Design of Institutions*, Edward Elgar.
- [28] Nurmi, H (2006) *Models of Political Economy*, Routledge.
- [29] Pansardi, P (2011) Power To and Power Over, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 521-524.
- [30] Pierre, J and Peters BG (2000) *Governance, Politics and the State*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- [31] Prittwitz, V von (2007) *Vergleichende Politikanalyse*, Lucius & Lucius UTB.
- [32] Riker, WH (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism*, Freeman.
- [33] Senior, B (2002) *Organisational Change*, Prentice Hall.
- [34] Taylor, AD and Pacelli, AM (2008), *Mathematics and Politics*, 2nd ed., Springer.
- [35] Zürn, M (2012) Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press: 730-744.

8.3 Optional Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core and required supplementary reading students might find it helpful and/or informative to read (selective parts of) the following source:

- [36] Gallagher, M et al. (1995) *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, McGraw Hill.
- [37] Imperial, MT (1999) Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, *Environmental Management* 24: 449-465.
- [38] Jordan, A, Wurzel, RK, and Zito, A (2005) The Rise of 'New' Policy Instruments in Comparative Perspective: Has Governance Eclipsed Government?, *Political Studies* 53: 477-496.
- [39] Johnson, P and Gill J (1993) *Management Control and Organizational Behaviour*, Paul Chapman Publishing.
- [40] Kersbergen, K. van and Waarden, F. van (2004) 'Governance' as a Bridge Between Disciplines: Cross-disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy, *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 143-171.
- [41] Kumar, S (2010) *Corporate Governance*, Oxford University Press.
- [42] Lattemann, C (2010) *Corporate Governance im globalisiertem Informationszeitalter*, Oldenbourg.
- [43] Morriss, P (1987/2002) *Power: A Philosophical Analysis*, 2nd edn., Manchester University Press.
- [44] Orvis, S and Drogus, CA (2015), *Introducing Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases in Context*, SAGE / CQ Press.
- [45] Polski, MM and Ostrom, E (1999) An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design, Indiana University, *Mimeo*.
- [46] Tricker, B (2019) *Corporate Governance*, 4th edn., Oxford University Press. *)
- [47] Weber, M (1972) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen.

8.4 Case Study Reading

- [48] Achen, CH and Bartels, LM (2016), *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*, Princeton University Press.
- [49] Birkmeier, O et al. (2012) A Gentle Combination of Plurality Vote and Proportional Representation for Bundestag Elections, in: Felsenthal, DS and Machover, M (eds), *Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures*, Springer: 151-171.
- [50] Blum, C and Zuber, CI (2016) Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives, *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 24: 162-182.
- [51] Brennan, J (2016) *Against Democracy*, Princeton University Press.
- [52] Brooker, P (2014) *Non-Democratic Regimes*, 3rd edn., Palgrave Macmillan.
- [53] Bouricius, TG (2013) Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day, *Journal of Public Deliberation* 9(1), Article 11.
- [54] Deemen, A van (1993) Paradoxes of Voting in List Systems of Proportional Representation, *Electoral Studies* 12: 234-241.
- [55] Deschouwer, K (2019) Electoral Representation, in: Tanasecu, M and Dupont, C (eds), *The Edges of Political Representation: Mapping, Critiquing and Pushing the Boundaries*, ECPR Press / Rowman & Littlefield International: 9-26.
- [56] Dummett, M (1997) *Principles of Electoral Reform*, Oxford University Press.
- [57] Green-Armytage, J (2015) Direct Voting and Proxy Voting, *Constitutional Political Economy* 26: 190-220.
- [58] Kurrild-Klitgaard, P (2008) Paradoxes of Voting in List Systems of Proportional Representation: Evidence From Eight Danish Elections, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 31: 242-267.
- [59] Machover, M (2012) The Underlying Assumptions of Electoral Systems, in: Felsenthal, DS and Machover, M (eds), *Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures*, Springer: 3-9.
- [60] Miller, JC (1969), A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process, *Public Choice* 7: 107-113.
- [61] Mounk, Y (2018) *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*, The Belknap Press.
- [62] Mudde, C and Kaltwasser, CR (2017) *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press.
- [63] Müller, W (2016) *What Is Populism?*, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- [64] Reybrouck, D v (2016) *Against Elections - The Case for Democracy*, Bodley Head.
- [65] Riker, WH (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Waveland Press.
- [66] Shubik, M (1970) On Homo Politicus and the Instant Referendum, *Public Choice* 9: 79-84.

Note: All sources for the course will be made available on the e-learning server. In some instances which are marked with an *), currently, only an earlier edition of the source will be available.

9. Accreditation

- Economics (MA):
 - Modul Area Specialization „Governance“: Governance, Competition & Social Development
 - Modul Area: Individual Focus

- IWG:
Modulbereich c (Vertiefung): Spezialisierung „Governance & Public Management“
Modulbereich: Individueller Schwerpunkt
- P&E (MA):
Modul Area: Specialization

10. Responsible Student Assistant for the Course

All requests regarding the course should, in the first instance, be addressed to:

- Johannes Hahn:
E-mail: johannes.hahn@uni-bayreuth.de

Document last revised: 08 April 2021