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Summer Semester 2023

# Governance & 'Politik'

(35540/35541 - 3 SWS)

## 1. Objectives

The main aim of this course is to make students familiar with the existing concepts and conceptions of governance and to enable them to independently apply these concepts and conceptions for the analysis of the polity and politics of (nation) states, bureaucracies, and international organizations. Moreover, the course introduces students to selected core concepts, conceptions, and frameworks in political science.

# 2. Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this course students should

- be familiar with selected core concepts, conceptions and frameworks in political science,
- be familiar with the existing concepts and conceptions of governance,
- be able to apply the above concepts, conceptions, and frameworks in order to independently analyse the polity and politics of (nation) states, bureaucracies, and international organizations,
- have some basic understanding how collective choice (and game) theory can be utilized in order to analyse governance structures.

# 3. Pre-requisites

None.

# 4. Teaching and Learning Strategies

This course is intended to be an interactive lecture and tutorial course formally comprising 11 lectures (90 minutes) and 11 tutorials (60 minutes). At the end of the course an additional 'Question & Answer' session will be offered on

Tuesday 11 July 2023, 17:30-18:00 (RW II S 40).

Lecture slides and the tutorials' material will be made available on the e-learning server.

## 5. Schedule

During the semester the lectures (L) and tutorials (T) will take place as follows	the lectures (L) and tutorials (T) will take place	as follows:
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Lecture/Tutorial	Day	Date	Time	Room
01 (L)	Tuesday	18 Apr	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
01 (T)	Wednesday	19 Apr	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
02 (L)	Tuesday	25 Apr	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
02 (T)	Wednesday	26 Apr	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
03 (L)	Tuesday	02 May	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
03 (T)	Wednesday	03 May	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
04 (L)	Tuesday	09 May	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
04 (T)	Wednesday	10 May	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
05 (L)	Tuesday	16 May	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
05 (T)	Wednesday	17 May	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
06 (L)	Tuesday	23 May	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
07 (1) (L)	Wednesday	24 May	10:00 - 11:00	RW II H21
06 (T)	Wednesday	24 May	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
08 (L)	Tuesday	06 Jun	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
07 (2) (L)	Wednesday	07 Jun	10:00 - 11:00	RW II H21
07 (T)	Wednesday	07 Jun	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
09 (L)	Tuesday	13 Jun	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
08 (T)	Wednesday	14 Jun	10:00 - 11:00	BGI S 88
09 (T)	Wednesday	14 Jun	11:00 - 12:00	BGI S 88
10 (L)	Tuesday	20 Jun	16:15 - 17:45	RW II S 40
10 (T)	Wednesday	21 Jun	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11
Reserve (L)	Tuesday	04 Jul	16:00 - 17:30	via Zoom
11 (L)	Tuesday	11 Jul	16:00 - 17:30	RW II S 40
11 (T)	Wednesday	12 Jul	11:00 - 12:00	NWI H 11

#### 6. Assessment

The course is assessed by a one-hour unseen written examination at the end of the term. In the exam students can achieve a maximum of 100 marks. (If the number of participating students is less than five, an oral examination may replace the written one. Students will be informed about the form of examination as soon as possible.) The date of the examination can be found on http://www.bwl5.uni-bayreuth.de/de/studiendekan/klausurtermine/. Students must register for the examination via CAMPUSonline. Only if students cannot register via CAMPUSonline they can register via e-mail by sending an e-mail to Ann-Kathrin Schrickel: ann-kathrin.schrickel@uni-bayreuth.de. This e-mail must only contain the title of the course, the student's surname, first name, ID number and degree of study as well as a brief indication why registration via e-mail is required. The registration deadline is one week in advance to the date of the examination. Later registrations will not be accepted.

Moreover, students have the opportunity to earn up to 10 bonus marks (which will be added to the marks achieved in the written examination), if they agree to deliver a presentation of about 15-20 minutes length on a selected topic and to produce a corresponding handout (about 2-3 pages). The available topics will be announced during the first lecture (and will also be available on the e-learning server). Students are expected to submit a draft version of their handout (and presentation if available) two days in advance of their presentation and a final version one week after their presentation. The decision on the allocation of the topics to students will take place during the second lecture.

#### 7. Lecture Programme

#### **Part I: Core Concepts**

1. Concepts vs. Conceptions

[7]:3

2. 'Politik'

[14]: 4-6; [31]: 25-28

3. Institutions and Organizations

[1]: 164, 171, 177 f.; [9]: 7-10; [12]: 22 f.; [15]: 12-20, 60-62; [17]: 33; [21]: 62; [23]: 5 f.; [33]: 4-7

4. Power, Authority, and Influence

[4]: 11-16; [6]; [11]; [20]: 143-153, [21]: 66; [22]: 316-323; [23]: 518, [24], [29], [43]: xiv-xvii (optional reading), 15-17 (optional reading), 29-35 (optional reading), [47]: 28

5. Governance

[2]; [3]: 1-15; [9]: 1-15; [10]; [13]; [38] (optional reading); [39]: 53-61 (optional reading); [40] (optional reading); [41]: 5f. (Optional reading); [42]: 1-3 (optional reading); [46]: 66-69 (optional reading), 70-73 (optional reading)

## **Part II: Conceptions and Frameworks**

6. Institutional Rational Choice

[12]: 21-64, [37] (optional reading), [45] (optional reading)

7. Organizational Governance

[3]: 16-36; [22]: 382 f.

8. Governance of States

[5]: 89-93, 145-150; [8]: 52-69; [26]: 20-23

- 8.1 Democracy [7]: 83-98; [8]: 70-88; [25]: 35; [26]: 42
- 8.2 Authoritarian Rule

[5]: 353-408; [7]: 99-117; [8]: 89-105; [26]: 59

- 8.3 Measures of Democracy and the Authoritarian Rule[5]: 150-173
- 9. Governance and Society: Linking State and Society
  - 9.1 Basic Paradigms: Liberal-Pluralism, Marxism-Leninism, and Corporatism[9]: 22 f.; [16]: 1-26, 152-176, [36]: 359-387 (optional reading)
  - 9.2 Problems with Group Decision-making[5]: 409-420; [27]: 134-138; [28]: 121-137
  - 9.3 Elections

[5]: 521-583; [8]: 252-269; [26]: 248-256; [44]: 324-337

9.4 General Collective Choice Problems

[5]: 420-422, 434-441; [27]: 138-147; [32]: 115-173, [34]: 205-231

- 10. Governance and Government
  - 10.1 Constitutions and Law [8]: 106-123; [26]: 77-90
  - 10.2 Multilevel Governance[7]: 271-293; [8]: 179-198; [19] (optional reading); [26]: 110-137
  - 10.3 Legislatures

[8]: 141-159

- 10.4 The Political Executive [5]: 453-511; [7]: 319-344; [8]: 124-140
- 10.5 Public Governance
  - [3]: 57-79; [8]: 160-178; [9]: 19-58; [26]: 155-174
- 11. Global Governance (self study)

[3]: 80-100; [9]: 59-98; [18]; [30]: 75-93; [35]

## Part III: Case Studies

#### 12. Democracy & Populism

- 12.1 Liberalism vs. Populism: Two Approaches To Democracy[48]: 1-12; [65]: 4-14, 233-252
- 12.2 What is Populism [62]: 1-20; [63]: 7-74 (optional reading)
- 12.3 Populism and Democracy[62]: 79-96; [63]: 7-74 (optional reading)
- 12.4 Causes and Responses to Populism[62]: 97-118; [63]: 75-103 (optional reading)
- 12.5 The Crisis of Liberal Democracy

[61]: 23-132

- 12.6 Origins of the Crisis of Liberal Democracy[61]: 133-182
- 12.7 The Democratic Fatigue Syndrome: Symptoms and Diagnoses[65]: 1-57
- 13. Electoral Representation and Electoral Reforms
  - 13.1 The Crisis of (Liberal) Democracy A Crisis of Electoral Representation?[55]
  - 13.2 The Dual Purpose of Elections & How to Think about Electoral Systems

[56]: 1-17

13.3 Proportional Representation and the Alternative to it & The Dual-Vote Device: The German Federal Electoral System

[56]: 18-35

- 13.4 Who Will Win? Who ought to Win? & Majority Preferences[56]: 36-37
- 13.5 Rival Criteria & Systems Based on Criteria[56]: 38-88
- 13.6 Proportional Representation & The Principles of Electoral Reform[56]: 158-186
- 14. Examining and Revising the German Federal Electoral System
  - 14.1 Inconsistencies Between Votes and Seats[49]
  - 14.2 Inconsistencies Between Preferences and Seats[54]; [58]; [59]
- 15. Democracy of the Future
  - 15.1 Direct Voting and Proxy Voting[57]; [61]; [67]
  - 15.2 Representative Democracy via Sortition[65]: 138-150; [53]
  - 15.3 Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives[50]
- 16. Against Democracy A Case for Epistocracy
  - 16.1 Ignorant, Irrational, Misinformed Nationalists?[51]: 1-17, 23-53
  - 16.2 Political Participation Corrupts?[51]: 54-73
  - 16.3 Empowerment of Whom?
    - [51]: 74-111
- 17. Non-Democratic Regimes
  - 17.1 Studying Non-Democratic Regimes & The Three Phases of Modernizing the Non-Democratic Rule

[52]: 1-12

17.2 Theoretical Approaches to Non-Democratic Regimes

[52]: 13-40

17.3 Disguised Dictatorship

[52]: 225-254

*Note:* The numbers in brackets refer to numbers of the sources below.

## 8. Literature

## 8.1 Core Reading

- [1] Bates, FL and Harvey, CC (1975) The Structure of Social Systems, Gardner Press.
- [2] Benz, A and Dose, N (2009) Governance Modebegriff oder nützliches sozialwissenschaftliches Konzept?, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., VS Verlag: 13-36.
- [3] Bevir, M (2012) Governance: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press.
- [4] Braham, M (2008) Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis, in: Braham, M and Steffen, F (eds), *Power, Freedom, and Voting*, Springer: 1-21.
- [5] Clark, WR, Golder, M, and Golder SN (2018) *Principles of Comparative Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., Sage. \*)
- [6] Dowding, K (2011) Authority, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 36-39.
- [7] Hague, R and Harrop, M (2010) Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 8<sup>th</sup> edn., Palgrave Macmillan.
- [8] Hague, R et al. (2019) *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 11<sup>th</sup> edn., Red Globe Press. \*)
- [9] Kjaer, AM (2004) Governance, Polity Press.
- [10] Levi-Faur, D (2012) From "Big Government" to "Big Governance"?, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford University Press: 3-18.
- [11] Morriss, P (2011) Ability, in: Dowding, K (ed.), Encyclopedia of Power, Sage: 1 f.
- [12] Ostrom, E (2007) Institutional Rational Choice, in: Sabatier, PA (ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Westview Press: 21-64.
- [13] Peters, BG (2012) Governance as Political Theory, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford University Press: 19-32.
- [14] Schubert, K and Bandelow, N (2009) Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Oldenbourg
- [15] Voigt, S (2019) Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press..
- [16] Wiarda, HJ (1997) Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Ism", M.E. Sharpe.

# 8.2 Required Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core reading students should read (selected parts of) the following sources:

- [17] Arrow, KJ (1974) The Limits of Organization, Norton.
- [18] Behrens, M (2009) Global Governance, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), Governance
  Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., VS Verlag: 93-110.
- [19] Benz, A (2009) Multilevel Governance Governance in Mehrebenensystemen, in: Benz, A and Dose, N (eds), Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., VS Verlag: 111-135.
- [20] Braham, M and Holler, MJ (2005) The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 17: 137-157.
- [21] Brink, R van den and Steffen, F (2008) Positional Power in Hierarchies, in: Braham, M and Steffen, F (eds), *Power, Freedom, and Voting*, Springer: 57-81.
- [22] French, R et al. (2015) Organizational Behaviour, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., Wiley. \*)
- [23] Martin, J (1998) Organizational Behaviour, International Thomson Business Press.
- [24] Morriss, P (2011) Ableness, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, Sage: 2.

- [25] Newton, K and Deth JW van den (2010) *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Cambridge University Press.
- [26] Newton, K and Deth JW van den (2021) *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, 4<sup>th</sup> edn. Cambridge University Press.<sup>\*)</sup>
- [27] Nurmi, H (1998) Rational Behaviour and the Design of Institutions, Edward Elgar.
- [28] Nurmi, H (2006) Models of Political Economy, Routledge.
- [29] Pansardi, P (2011) Power To and Power Over, in: Dowding, K (ed.), *Encyclopedia* of Power, Sage: 521-524.
- [30] Pierre, J and Peters BG (2000) *Governance*, *Politics and the State*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- [31] Prittwitz, V von (2007) Vergleichende Politikanalyse, Lucius & Lucius UTB.
- [32] Riker, WH (1982) Liberalism Against Populism, Freeman.
- [33] Senior, B (2002) Organisational Change, Prentice Hall.
- [34] Taylor, AD and Pacelli, AM (2008), *Mathematics and Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Springer.
- [35] Zürn, M (2012) Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance, in: Levi-Faur, D (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford University Press: 730-744.

#### 8.3 Optional Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core and required supplementary reading students might find it helpful and/or informative to read (selective parts of) the following source:

- [36] Gallagher, M et al. (1995) *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, McGraw Hill.
- [37] Imperial, MT (1999) Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, *Environmental Management* 24: 449-465.
- [38] Jordan, A, Wurzel, RK, and Zito, A (2005) The Rise of 'New' Policy Instruments in Comparative Perspective: Has Governance Eclipsed Government?, *Political Studies* 53: 477-496.
- [39] Johnson, P and Gill J (1993) *Management Control and Organizational Behaviour*, Paul Chapman Publishing.
- [40] Kersbergen, K. van and Waarden, F. van (2004) 'Governance' as a Bridge Between Disciplines: Cross-disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy, *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 143-171.
- [41] Kumar, S (2010) Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press.
- [42] Lattemann, C (2010) Corporate Governance im globalisiertem Informationszeitalter, Oldenbourg.
- [43] Morriss, P (1987/2002) Power: A Philosophical Analysis, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Manchester University Press.
- [44] Orvis, S and Drogus, CA (2015), *Introducing Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases in Context*, SAGE / CQ Press.
- [45] Polski, MM and Ostrom, E (1999) An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design, Indiana University, *Mimeo*.
- [46] Tricker, B (2019) Corporate Governance, 4th edn., Oxford University Press.\*)
- [47] Weber, M (1972) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen.

#### 8.4 Case Study Reading

- [48] Achen, CH and Bartels, LM (2016), *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*, Princeton University Press.
- [49] Birkmeier, O et al. (2012) A Gentle Combination of Plurality Vote and Proportional Representation for Bundestag Elections, in: Felsenthal, DS and Machover, M (eds), Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures, Springer: 151-171.
- [50] Blum, C and Zuber, CI (2016) Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives, *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 24: 162-182.
- [51] Brennan, J (2016) Against Democracy, Princeton University Press.
- [52] Brooker, P (2014) Non-Democratic Regimes, 3rd edn., Palgrave Macmillan.
- [53] Bouricius, TG (2013) Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day, *Journal of Public Deliberation* 9(1), Article 11.
- [54] Deemen, A van (1993) Paradoxes of Voting in List Systems of Proportional Representation, *Electoral Studies* 12: 234-241.
- [55] Deschouwer, K (2019) Electoral Representation, in: Tanasecu, M and Dupont, C (eds), *The Edges of Political Representation: Mapping, Critiquing and Pushing the Boundaries*, ECPR Press / Rowman & Littlefield International: 9-26.
- [56] Dummett, M (1997) Principles of Electoral Reform, Oxford University Press.
- [57] Green-Armytage, J (2015) Direct Voting and Proxy Voting, *Constitutional Political Economy* 26: 190-220.
- [58] Kurrild-Klitgaard, P (2008) Paradoxes of Voting in List Systems of Proportional Representation: Evidence From Eight Danish Elections, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 31: 242-267.
- [59] Machover, M (2012) The Underlying Assumptions of Electoral Systems, in: Felsenthal, DS and Machover, M (eds), Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures, Springer: 3-9.
- [60] Miller, JC (1969), A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process, *Public Choice* 7: 107-113.
- [61] Mounk, Y (2018) *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*, The Belknap Press.
- [62] Mudde, C and Kaltwasser, CR (2017) *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press.
- [63] Müller, W (2016) What Is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- [64] Reybrouck, D v (2016) Against Elections The Case for Democracy, Bodley Head.
- [65] Riker, WH (1982) Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice, Waveland Press.
- [66] Shubik, M (1970) On Homo Politicus and the Instant Referendum, *Public Choice* 9: 79-84.
- *Note:* All sources for the course will be made available on the e-learning server. In some instances which are marked with an <sup>\*</sup>), currently, only an earlier edition of the source will be available.

### 9. Accreditation

• Economics (MA):

Modul Area Specialization "Governance": Governance, Competition & Social Development

Modul Area: Individual Focus

■ IWG:

Modulbereich c (Vertiefung): Spezialisierung "Governance & Public Management" Modulbereich: Individueller Schwerpunkt

 P&E (MA): Modul Area: Specialization

# 10. Responsible Student Assistant for the Course

All requests regarding the course should, in the first instance, be addressed to:

• Ann-Kathrin Schrickel:

E-mail: ann-kathrin.schrickel@uni-bayreuth.de

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